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Abstract 
The core aim of this study is to examine the relationship between board characteristics and the 
firm performance of non-financial listed Kuwaiti firms. To achieve the objectives of the study, 
the data were collected from a sample of 136 companies for the financial year 2009. Variables 
such as CEO duality, COE tenure, audit committee size, board size and board composition 
were considered as predictors of the firm performance that was measured employing the return 
on assets (ROA). By contrast, the effects of CEO tenure and leverage on firm performance 
were found to be negative and significant at the chosen level of significance. To test the 
hypotheses of the study, multiple linear regression analysis using SPSS 18.0 was utilized. 
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Using the firm size and leverage as a control variable, the findings of the study support the 
positive effects of CEO duality and audit committee size on ROA. Other findings of the study 
were discussed in the discussion section and some other future study directions were provided. 
Keywords: Kuwaiti Stock Exchange, board characteristics, Firm Performance 
 
1. Introduction 
Businesses around the world require development and growth in order to attract funding from 
investors. Before they invest in a particular business, investors normally make sure that the 
business in question is financially secure and stable and possesses the ability to produce 
profits in the long run (Mallin, 2007). Hence, in instances where the company position is not 
as promising, it will not be as attractive to investors as it hopes to be. This failure to attract 
enough capital normally leads to negative consequences for the business in particular and for 
the economy in general.  
Based on the agency theory, the agency relationship is a contract whereby one or more person 
(principal) engages another person (agent) to perform some service on their behalf, which 
involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Nevertheless, the theory also holds the notion of the inappropriateness of management or the 
agent in taking the best possible action for the public and for the shareholders’ sake as the 
agents generally actin their own interests. Therefore, for the achievement of a balanced 
alignment between the principal’s and agent’s interests, and to remain within the agency 
budget, different internal as well as external corporate governance mechanisms have been 
expounded on (Haniffa & Huduib, 2006).   
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), it has 
been stated that “good corporate governance is essential for the economic growth led by the 
private sector and for the promotion of the social welfare".  In retrospect, since 1997, the 
Asian financial crisis has brought about a whole new meaning to corporate governance as 
evidenced from the crisis of confidence in the institutions and legislations that make up the 
governance of business and interactions between business and government.   
Further reiterating the importance of board of directors was done in the study carried out by 
Fama and Jensen (1983) who considered it as one of the main elements of governance. This 
is further evidenced by Limpaphayom and Connelly (2006) who stressed on the need and the 
effective characteristic of the role of the board of the directors in overseeing management. 
Additionally, it has also been argued that elements of the corporate governance such as CEO 
duality, CEO tenure, audit committee size, board size and board composition have an 
influence on the firm and its financial performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Coles &Jarrell 
2001; Weir et al., 2002). 
The Gulf region has been growing in terms of importance to the global economy after the 
discovery of the oil. In other words, the gulf region has become the gate of foreign 
investment to the Middle East region because it has a richer infrastructure and oil related 
business opportunities. And hence, the gulf countries began to initiate laws and rules which 
forward to protect a local and foreign investors. These are to promote the confidence of 
investors. Although the corporate governance in the Gulf States is still in the early stages of 
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development. But the study also indicates that real progress has happened with the start of the 
States to amend existing laws to companies and to strengthen mechanisms to meet the 
requirements of accounting and corporate governance in companies. Aware of the fact that 
good governance is a key factor in ensuring the sustainability of growth and development in 
the Gulf region. It can be seen that the decision-makers started to hold the lead and are 
committed to apply the criteria safer for corporate governance in the six GCC countries 
(Abdul Kadar, 2009). 
A close look at the performance of the Gulf markets shows during the recent period shows 
that the overall performance of Gulf countries’ market, which are the collective performance 
of companies in each country, has a fluctuation and tend to decline significantly at the end of 
2009 based on the latest available data and as illustrated in the graphs in Figure 1. Apart from 
the effect of the global financial crisis, the declining performance of the Gulf markets can be 
partially attributed to the lack of capital required to run or expand the business due to the 
decline of FDI inflows resulted from the lack of confidence of investors in the management 
practices of the Gulf companies. In other words, the lack of effective corporate governance 
mechanisms implemented in the Gulf business environment has hindered the enhancement of 
the company's performance due to the willingness of investors to confidently invest. This 
situation called for more researchers to be conducted in the Gulf region to explore the extent 
to which the corporate governance could affect the performance of firms in various business 
sectors.  
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As one of the countries of the Gulf region, Kuwait is one of the most important producers and 
exporters of oil not only in the Gulf region but also in the world, a founding member of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries - OPEC, and has the fifth-largest oil reserves 
in the world. Moreover, Kuwait has 10% of oil reserves in the world. However, oil and its 
related products represent about 95% of the export earnings and 80% of government revenues. 
It is considered one of the most developed countries in the Arab League, the fourth richest 
country for per capita income (GCC Stock markets website, 2011). 
The government of Kuwait has undertaken measures to improve its investment climate to 
make it more attractive to domestic as well as foreign capital investments. For instance, 
foreign investors are able to take up more than a single license for a number of business 
activities in Kuwait and a licensed business entity is generally permitted to possess the real 
estate that is required to carry out business activities as in the case of provision of employee 
housing facilities. 
Briefly, the main aim of this paper is to empirically investigate the impact of corporate 
governance (CEO duality, CEO tenure, audit committee size, board size and board 
composition) and firm performance among non-financial Kuwaiti firms. 
The remainder of this paper is focused on reviewing the relevant literature, describing the 
sample, data, and methodology and presenting the empirical results. A discussion of the 
findings and some ideas for future research are provided in the last section of the paper. 
2. Literature Review 
It is widely argued that when firms possess good governance systems, they display better 
performance as compared to other firms.  
This study has enlarged the literature of prior studies that examined the relationship between 
corporate governance (board characteristics) and firm performance. There are several studies 
have been done in developed and developing countries (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Rechner 
& Dalton, 1991; Coles & Jarrell, 2001; Rhoades et al, 2001; Khatri et al., 2002; Judge et al., 
2003; Brown & Caylor, 2004; Klapper & Love, 2004; Chen et al, 2005; Haniff & Hudaib, 
2006 and Kajol & Sunday, 2008) which examined the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. A thorough review of the relevant literature revealed that 
there is a paucity of studies examining the performance implications of corporate governance 
in the developing countries, in general, and in the Gulf region, in particular. This calls for 
further research work to be put forth to examine this relationship and that is the direction this 
study is trying to contribute to through examining the between corporate governance and firm 
performance of Kuwaiti listed companies.  
Corporate governance has been shown to be documented in an effective manner in the 
literature. For instance, most studies have examined the impact of the board characteristics 
(CEO duality, CEO tenure, audit committee, board size and composition of the Board) on 
firm performance. Hence this study will investigate the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms namely, CEO duality, CEO tenure, audit committee size, board size 
and board composition with the firm’s performance.   
2.1 CEO Duality and Firm Performance 
One aspect of corporate governance, which has given rise to concern, is the dominant 
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personality’ phenomenon that includes role duality, where the chief executive officer (CEO) 
or managing director is also the chair of the board. The agency theory argues that in favor of 
the separation of the CEO and chairman within the organization as it is imperative to 
establish efficient and effective check and balance by the board and CEO; non-duality leads 
to better performance than their counterparts without separation i.e., CEO duality (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983;Ramdani&Witteloostuijn, 2009). 
Alexander, Fennell and Halpern (1993) argued that CEO duality plays an important role in 
affecting the value of a firm. A single person being the Chairman and the CEO leads to the 
enhancement of the firm’s value and the cost between the two is eliminated.  However, 
White and Ingrassia, (1992) indicate that CEO duality can lead to the board’s worse 
performance as the board is unable to remove the underperforming CEO which can generate 
agency costs in cases where the CEO works for his own interest as opposed to the 
shareholders. Yermack (1996) argue that, when the CEO and board chair positions are 
separate, it increases the firm’s value. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that CEO duality in a 
firm favours the underperforming CEO as it is difficult for the board to remove him. 
There are several studies which have examined the relationship between CEO duality and 
firm’s performance but the results still lacks the consistency. For instance, Donaldson and 
Davis (1994) study the relationship between CEO duality and firm’s performance by using a 
sample of US companies. Their findings supported the positive relationship between CEO 
duality and performance and they concluded that companies with CEO duality demonstrated 
a greater return on equity (ROE) and shareholder wealth when compared to other companies.  
Similarly, Rechner and Dalton (1991) carried out a study on a sample of Fortune 500 
companies. They found that the CEO duality has a strong impact on the firm’s financial 
performance. Related to that are the findings of Goyal and Park (2002) that asserted that 
companies without CEO duality possess lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm 
performance. Sanda, Mukaila and Garba (2003) did a study on the performance of Nigerian 
companies and revealed a positive correlation between separating the functions of the CEO 
and Chairman and firm performance. While Boyd (1995) found a positive relationship 
between performance of US firms and CEO duality, Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) and Baliga, 
Moyer and Rao (1996) have found that there is no significant association between CEO 
duality and firm performance. 
On the contrary, Ramdani and Van (2009) concluded that CEO duality has an effect on firm 
performance solely on firms displaying average performance as opposed firms performing 
below or above par. Similarly, according to the conclusion drawn by Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006), despite the duality being uncommon in Malaysian corporations, companies with role 
duality seemed to perform worse than their counterparts with separate board leadership. in 
their study to examine the effect of corporate governance on Malaysian firm performance, 
Brickley, Coles and Jarell (1997) revealed that the CEO duality has no effect on firm 
performance. Based on the previous arguments and other supporting ones, it is reasonable to 
test the following hypothesized relationship: 
H1: There is a significant relationship between CEO duality and firm performance. 
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2.2 CEO Tenure and Firm Performance 
The leadership position of CEO in many studies has been measured by the number of years in 
leadership positions. Directors generally have limited tenures in their positions due to some 
sort of succession plan implemented frequently. This is done to prevent the provision of 
excessively long-term contracts which leads to the increase in the cost of management 
dismissal in case of poor performance. 
Several studies that have been conducted to investigate the relationship between CEO tenure 
and firms' performance found mixed results. For example, Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) found 
that there is negative relationship between CEO tenure and Ghana firms' performance. 
Performance-related turnovers are clearly observed in cases where the CEO left before 
retirement. In other words, the shorter the CEO’s tenure, the poorer is his performance. 
However, in cases where the top executive remains longer with a company until normal 
retirement age, performance is not an explanation for the change in CEO turnover. From 
another angle, longer CEO tenure means that the CEO is able to exercise power based on the 
argument from information asymmetry or CEO might have an indirect control of the board of 
director.   
On the contrary, In an earlier study carried out by Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989), they 
found that there is no significant relationship between CEO tenure and firms' performance. 
Thus it is meaningful to test the relationship postulated in the following hypothesis: 
H2: There is a relationship between CEO tenure and firm performance. 
 
2.3 Audit Committee Size and Firm Performance 
An audit committee refers to who is generally responsible to oversee the financial reporting 
and communication with the firm. The committee provides an invaluable communication 
between the internal and external auditors and the board helps to ensure it covers all the 
issues relevant to the audit. It is imperative for the board to set up an audit committee 
comprising at least three members who are non-executive directors, or two members in small 
businesses (Mallin, 2007). Kajol and Sunday (2008) argued that an increase of the numbers 
of the audit committee members indicates more experts available at hand for the overlooking 
of internal controls and financial reporting. Various accounting standards and principles must 
guarantee that general rules and regulations are employed by accountants in a large scale 
when they prepare financial statements and reports reflecting the exact state of the company 
(Yan, Jian, & Nan, 2007). 
Studies, in the literature, investigating the relationship between audit committee size and 
firms' performance found mixed results. For instance, Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) found that 
there is a positive relationship between audit committee size and firm performance. This was 
so, since the size of the audit committee may be related to the effectiveness to monitor 
mistakes in the financial reporting process and may lead to a positive impact on the firm 
performance.  
Similarly, Klein (1998) used a sample of 122 companies in the U.S to investigate the 
relationship between audit committee size and earning management. His findings confirmed 
the existence of a negative correlation between earnings management and audit committee 
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size. In addition, he found that when the capacity of audit committee size is big that it may 
lead to a declining firm performance. Based on the above, the following hypotheses are 
formulated:  
H3: There is a relationship between audit committee size and firm performance. 
 
2.4 Board Size and Firm Performance 
Board size refers to the number of directors in the board. It is an important factor to 
determine the effectiveness of the board. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that a bigger 
size board of directors may improve the companies’ board effectiveness and support the 
management in reducing agency cost that resulted from poor management and consequently 
leads to better financial results. The Chairman should be allowed to provide commands to all 
the executive and non-executive directors.  
In the relevant literature, even though there have been many studies that examined the 
relationship between board size and firm performance, the findings turned up to be 
inconclusive. In examining this relationship in the Japanese listed companies, Yokishawa and 
Phan (2004) found that there is a negative association between board size and firm 
performance. Similarly, Shakir (2008) found a negative relationship between board size and 
firm performance which supported the conclusion of Jensen (1993) that for a firm to be 
effective in its monitoring, it should have a relatively small board of directors. In relation to 
that, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) argued that a large board is seen as less effective in 
monitoring performance and could also be costly for companies in terms of compensation 
and increased incentives to shirk. The same conclusion was drawn by Bozeman and Daniel 
(2005) based on his study carried out on the Canadian public companies. His conclusion 
implies that the board size was also shown to have a negative relationship with performance 
measured by return on sales, sales efficiency and ROA.  
On the contrary, prior studies regarding the size of the board supported the positive 
relationship between the size of the board of directors and corporate performance. Large 
boards are viewed to lead to a better business performance owing to the wide variety of skills 
present for better decision making and monitor the performance of the CEO. For example, 
Adams and Mehran (2005) found a positive relationship between board size and performance 
in the U.S. banking industry. Moreover, Rechner and Dalton (1991) have also reported that 
large boards are associated with stronger performance. These results supported the conclusion 
made by Pfeffer (1972) and Zahra and Pearce (1989) regarding the relationship between the 
board size and firm performance. Therefore, based on the theoretical perspective and 
discussion above, the following hypothesis is formulated:  
H4: There is a significant relationship between board size and firm performance. 
 
2.5 Board Composition and Firm Performance 
Board composition has been highly debated in the realms of economics, organizational 
science literatures, and finance on the empirical and the theoretical levels. It has also been 
debated that effective ways of monitoring can assist the boards in making executives 
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effectively take care of the shareholder’s interests rather than their own (Ramdani & Van, 
2009). According to agency theory, a larger proportion of independent directors generally 
provide better firm performance. In general, it has been concluded by Ramdani and Van 
(2009) that the proportion of independent directors has an effect on firm performance. 
Previous studies examining the relationship between board composition and firm 
performance have been inconsistent. For example, some researchers (such as Forsberg, 
1989;Hermalin&Weisbach, 1991; Zahra & Pearce, 1989) found that there is no significant 
relationship. On the other hand, other studies found that firms with board of directors 
dominated by outsiders are able to perform better (Adams & Mehran, 1995 ;John & Senbet, 
1998). 
Moreover, Forsberg (1989) found no relationship between the proportion of outside directors 
and various performance measures. From a different perspective, some other researchers 
(such as Kosnik, 1987; Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 2006) found a positive association 
between the proportion of outside board members and performance. Arguably, many studies 
(such as (Klein, 1998; Rechner & Dalton, 1991; Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Baysinger & Butler, 
1985) supported the premises of the agency theory. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and 
Bhagat and Black (2002) found there is no relation between the degree of board 
independence and four measures of firm performance. Based on the theoretical perspective 
and discussion above, the following hypothesis was to be tested:  
H5: There is a relationship between board composition and firm performance. 
 
This study also considered the effect of two control variables namely, firm size and leverage, 
when investigating the corporate board characteristics and firm performance relationship. The 
two variables were briefly described as in the following. 
2.6 Firm Size 
Using firm size as the control variable in this study is motivated by the fact that it has been 
found to be associated with companies with different characteristics. Lehn et al. (2003), 
argued firm size and growth are important determinants of the size and structure of the boards. 
They found that firm size is directly related to the size and inversely proportional to the proxy 
for growth opportunities, that insider representation is inversely proportional to firm size and 
directly related to the proxy for opportunities growth and thus, a firm size has an effect on the 
firm performance. 
2.7 Leverage 
Leverage has been widely used as a control variable by a number of empirical studies (such 
as Kyereboah-Coleman, Biekpe, 2006;Alsaeed; 2006)that have examined the relationship 
between corporate governance and financial performance of the company.In their attempt to 
justify taking the leverage as a control variable, these studies have revealed that the debt has 
an effect on the financial performance of the company.As suggested by Alsaeed (2006), the 
firm leverage was measured by dividing total of liabilities by the total of assets. 
In the light of the above discussion, Table 1 summarizes the operational definitions of the 
variables used in this study following the common literature. 
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 Table 1: Research Variables 
Variables  Acronym Operationalization 
Return On Assets 
ratio 
ROA 
Earnings before tax divided 
by total assets of the 
company. 
CEO Duality (0/1) CEODUATY 
Dummy variable equal to "1" 
if the CEO is also the chair of 
the board, and "0" otherwise 
CEO Tenure (year) CEOTENUR 
The period of CEO's serving 
in the company 
Audit Committee 
Size (number) 
AUDITSIZ 
Number of members serving 
on the audit committee 
Board Size (number) BOADSIZE 
Total number of directors 
serving on the board of 
directors 
Board Composition 
(%) 
BOADCOM 
The ratio of independence 
directors to the total number 
of directors 
Firm Size (number) FIRMSIZE The natural log of total assets 
Leverage (%) LEVERAGE 
The ratio of total liabilities to 
total assets 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Research Design 
To achieve the objectives of this study, the correlation study research design  was used to 
investigate the relationships between COE duality, CEO tenure, audit committee size, board 
size and board composition as independent variables and firm performance (ROA) as the 
dependent variable. 
3.2 Data Collection 
The scope of this study was the companies listed in the Kuwait stock exchange as in 2009. 
The total number of companies listed on the Kuwait stock exchange are228. All of them are 
categorized into groups similar to how they were on the Stock Exchange. The population of 
the study comprises non-financial firms listed on the Kuwait stock exchange 
(www.kuwaitse.com/portal/a/stock/companies.aspx). According to the above body, there are 
136 non-financial companies included on the main board and secondary board as of 20th 
September 2009. The banks and financial institutions have not been included in this study 
due to the differences in the regulatory requirements and the characteristics of the financial 
reports from those of the non-financial firms (Alsaeed, 2006).  
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Therefore, the data required for the study was collected from 136 non-financial firms. As 
mentioned before, the choice for the year 2009 is opted due to the fact that 2009 is the most 
advanced source of information at the initiation of the study.  
3.3 Data Collection Procedures  
The secondary data provides a reliable source of the information needed by researchers to 
investigate the phenomenon and seek efficient ways for problem solving situations (Sekaran, 
2003). The data required for this study was collected from the annual reports of the 
companies that listed in the official trading market stock website as known Kuwait stock 
exchange (www.kuwaitse.com/portal/a/stock/companies.aspx) as in the end of 2009. 
Specifically, they were collected from the annual reports particularly from the portion 
expounding on corporate information and statement of corporate governance as well as from 
the director’s profile. Regarding the data related to the firm performance, they were collected 
business statements like balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow statement provided 
in the annual reports.  
Secondary data were collected owing to the ease of availability and for the purpose of 
answering the research question; the entire data needed were taken from the annual reports of 
the companies listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange. The researcher made use of the internet 
Netscape Navigator to assist in carrying out the present study and to look through the 
companies’ websites and home pages for their total assets and their profitability. 
3.4 Model Specification and Multiple Regressions 
Based on the hypothesis development procedures, The following regression equation was 
meant to be estimated: 
FIRMPFR = β0 + β1* CEODUATY + β2*CEOTENUR + β3*AUDITSIZ   +β4 BOADSIZE + 
β5*BOADCOM + β6*FIRMSIZE + β7*LEVERAGE + ε  
Where: 
FIRMPFR – Firm Performance 
β0 – Constant 
CEODUATY– CEO duality 
CEOTENUR –CEO tenure  
AUDITSIZ – audit committee size 
BOADSIZE –board size  
BOADCOM – board composition 
FIRMSIZE – Firm Size 
LEVERAGE – Leverage  
ε - Error term 
4. Data Analysis and Results  
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Before undertaking the hypothesis testing procedures, an initial summary of the variables was 
generated as illustrated in Table 2. 
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Table 2: 
Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
CEODUATY  136 0.566 0.497 0.000 1.000 
CEOTENUR 136 7.000 2.831 2.000 15.000 
AUDITSIZ 136 2.757 1.220 0.000 5.000 
BOADSIZE  136 6.162 1.516 3.000 11.000 
BOADCOM   136 74.116 11.873 33.330 100.000 
FIRMSIZE  136 5.007 0.609 3.950 6.780 
LEVERAGE 136 40.536 21.988 1.480 83.760 
ROA  136 1.037 8.714 -26.730 19.920 
The Table 2 above displays the descriptive statistics of the variables of the study showing the 
mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum. The summary reveals that the CEO 
serves as chairman of the board for 15% of the sample. In other words, the duality of CEO in 
the sample is considered as low as evidenced by the agency theory which states the 
importance of the separation of the role of CEO and chair of the board. The mean of the CEO 
tenure is 7 years with a minimum of 2 and maximum of 15. The mean of the size of the audit 
committee is 2.8; this is in line with requirement in the MCCG Code which is at least 3 
members.  
The descriptive statistics also revealed that the mean board size is about 6, which shows that 
consumer product sector firms in Kuwait possess a relatively moderate board size, having a 
maximum of 11 members. This means that the board sizes are appropriate for firm’s optimum 
performance as evidenced by Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) who stated that the 
bigger the board size, the less effective it would mean for the firm performance. These figures, 
however, consistent with those found by Shakir (2008) and Mak&Li (2001). It can be noticed 
that the mean of the percentage of independent directors on the board is 74.13, higher than 
what is necessary in the stock market which states that 33.33 % of independent directors 
should comprise a full board.    
In addition to that, the mean of the firm size is 5.007 while the maximum and minimum are 
6.7800 and 3.9500 respectively with standard deviation of 0.609. Similarly, the mean of the 
leverage is 40.536% while the maximum and minimum are 83.76 and 1.48 respectively with 
standard deviation of 21.988. 
It is clear that based on the ROA, there is a wide deviation between firms. Showing a mean 
performance of 1.037%, the minimum reported performance over the period is -26.73%, 
whiles the maximum ROA is 19.92% with standard deviation of 8.714 between firms. 
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4.2 Correlation Analysis 
Correlation analysis is the statistical tool that can be utilized to determine the level of 
association between two variables (Levin & Rubin, 1998). This analysis can be seen as the 
initial step in statistical modelling to determine the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables. Prior to carrying out a multiple regression analysis, a correlation 
matrix was developed to analyze the relationships between the independent variables as this 
would assist in developing a prediction multiple model which will reveal no relationship in 
cases where the value of the correlation is 0. On the other hand, a correlation of ±1.0 means 
there is a perfect positive or negative relationship (Hair et al., 2010). The values are 
interpreted between 0 (no relationship) and 1 (perfect relationship). Also, the relationship is 
considered small when r = ±0.1 to ±0.29, while the relationship is considered medium when r 
= ±0.30 to ±0.49, and when r is ±0.50 and above, the relationship can be considered strong. 
Table 3 below reveals the correlation between CEO duality, CEO tenure, audit committee size, 
board size, board composition, firm size and leverage with firm performance (ROA). 
  Table 3: Correlations of the Variables 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
CEODUATY (1)   0.095 -0.382** -0.368** -0.558** 0.005 -0.056 0.093 
CEOTENUR (2)   
 
-0.013 0.029 -0.002 0.041 0.031 -0.615** 
AUDITSIZ    
(3) 
  
  
0.794** 0.520** 0.227** 0.122 0.09 
BOADSIZE  (4)   
   
0.449** 0.331** 0.174* -0.028 
BOADCOM (5)   
    
0.142 0.073 -0.097 
FIRMSIZE    
(6) 
  
     
0.467** -0.042 
LEVERAGE  
(7) 
  
      
-0.156 
ROA             
(8) 
                
**:p<0.01; 
*:p<0.05 
                
Table 3 displays the correlations between the governance variables and control variables with 
firm performance. These findings show that CEO duality positively correlated (r=0.093, 
p>0.05) with ROA but not significant at the 0.05 level of significance. However, there is a 
negative correlation between CEO tenure (r= -0.615, p<0.01) with ROA at the 0.01 level of 
significance. 
In addition to that, the correlation between audit committee size and ROA was positive but 
not significant at the 0.05 level of significance (r= 0.090, p>0.05). Moreover, board size, 
board composition, firm size and leverage have negative but insignificant relationships with 
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the ROA at the 0.05 level of significance with coefficients (r=-0.028, p>0.05), (r=-0.097, 
p>0.05), (r=-0.042, p>0.05) and (r=-0.156, p>0.05) respectively.  
In sum, as evidenced by the above, it can be seen that two variables have a positive 
correlation with ROA, namely CEO duality, audit committee size. By contrast, five variables 
have a negative correlation with ROA, namely CEO tenure, board size, board composition, 
firm size and leverage. 
4.3 Hypotheses Testing Procedures 
Multiple regression analysis is a statistical method utilized to determine the relationship 
between one dependent variable and one or more independent variables (Hair et al., 2010). 
Before undertaking the regression analysis, this study examined whether the regression 
assumption were fulfilled. 
4.3.1 Testing the Assumptions of Multiple Linear Regressions 
Prior to carrying out a multiple regression analysis, it is important to note that there are some 
general assumptions required for this analysis. These assumptions related to the residual 
terms that have to be independent and identically normally distributed with a uniform 
variance. 
First, the normality of the variables was examined using the skewness and kurtosis. 
According to Kline (2011), the univariate normality of the variables can be assumed if the 
skewness statistic is within the interval (-3.0, 3.0) and the kurtosis statistic lying in the 
interval (-10.0, 10.0). Table 4 showed that the variables have no substantial deviation from 
being normally distributed. 
Table 4: Normality Tests 
Variables 
N Skewness Kurtosis 
statistic statistic Std.Error Statistic Std.Error 
CEODUATY 136 -0.27 0.208 -1.956 0.413 
CEOTENUR 136 0.671 0.209 -0.429 0.414 
AUDITSIZ 136 -0.665 0.208 0.389 0.413 
BOADSIZE 136 0.368 0.208 0.252 0.413 
BOADCOM 136 -0.697 0.208 0.352 0.413 
FIRMSIZE 136 0.681 0.208 0.565 0.413 
LEVERAGE 136 0.059 0.208 -0.883 0.413 
ROA 136 -0.677 0.208 0.53 0.413 
 
In examining the regression assumptions, a histogram chart plotting the distribution of the 
residuals was carried out through the utilization of SPSS software program. Besides, the 
scatter plot of the predicted values and the residuals show a scattered point with no trend 
indicating that the error terms are independent and approximately normally distributed with 
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uniform variance. 
Table 4 shows that the values of skewness are located in the range between -3 and +3. On the 
other hand, the values of kurtosis lie between ±10 including ownership. Therefore, all the 
variables of the study can be described to have been approximately distributed (Kline , 2011). 
4.3.2Multicollinearity Test 
The issue of multicolinearity may arise if two or more variables are highly correlated. It may 
affect the estimation of the regression parameters (Hair et al., 2010)..It can be detected either 
by examining the correlation matrix or by the variance inflated factor (VIF).The most 
common multicolinearity detection test is the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each 
independent variable (Naseret al., 2002). 
If the (VIF) is more than 10 for any independent variable, it indicates that this variable is 
highly explained by other variables and might be considered for exclusion from the model 
(Silver, 1997). For this study, the VIF for all the independent variables was reported as 
reported in Table 5. However, the VIF for all the independent variables was far lower than the 
cut off value of 10 as suggested by (Hair et al., 2010) and thus confirming the absence of the 
multicolinearity issue.  
Table 5: Variance Inflation Factor 
Variable VIF 
CEODUATY 1.549 
CEOTENUR 1.020 
AUDITSIZ 2.986 
BOADSIZE 2.968 
BOADCOM 1.737 
FIRMSIZE 1.441 
LEVERAGE 1.289 
 
4.3.3Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
To test the hypotheses of the study, the multiple linear regression analysis was employed 
using the firm's financial performance (ROA) as dependent variables and independent 
variables comprising of CEO duality, CEO tenure, audit committee size, board size and board 
composition as independent variables. The firm size and leverage were also used as control 
variables. 
The results of the regression analysis were presented in Table 6. Based on the regression 
results, the model is valid meaning that at least one of the variables is a significant 
determinant of the firm performance (F value= 15.403, p<0.001). In addition, the variables 
included in the model were able to explain 43 % of the variance in the ROA as shown by the 
adjusted by R
2
indicator. These results also indicate that 57 % of the variance in the ROA 
might be explained by other factors which were not included in the model.  
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Table 6: 
The Coefficients of Multiple Regression Analysis 
Variable Coefficients Std. Error 
T 
Value 
Sig. 
 Unstandardized Standardized    
(Constant) 16.816  6.420 2.619 0.010 
CEODUATY 2.836 0.164** 1.406 2.018 0.046 
CEOTENUR -1.884 -0.620*** 0.200 -9.413 0.000 
AUDITSIZ 2.200 0.312*** 0.795 2.769 0.006 
BOADSIZE -0.822 -0.145 0.636 -1.293 0.198 
BOADCOM -0.084 -0.116 0.062 -1.349 0.180 
FIRMSIZE 0.604 0.043 1.103 0.547 0.585 
LEVERAGE -0.052 -0.133* 0.029 -1.801 0.074 
  
 
   
F value 
 
 
  
15.403 
F 
significance 
 
 
  
0.000 
R
2
 
 
 
  
0.459 
Adjusted R
2
 
 
 
  
0.429 
***:p<0.01; **:p<0.05; *:p<0.1 
 
Based on the results in Table 6, CEO duality was found to have a positive significant effect 
on the ROA at the 0.05 level of significance (β=  0.164, t= 2.018, p<0.05).  
Similarly, the CEO tenure was found to have a negative significant impact on the firm 
performance (β= -0.620 , t= -9.413, p<0.001) at the 0.001 level of significance. This implies 
that if the CEO tenure increases by one year, the firm performance will decrease by about 
-1.884. Following the same reasoning, the audit committee size was a positive significant 
predictor of the firm performance at the 0.01 level of significance (β= 0.312, t= 2.769, 
p<0.01). This means that if the audit committee size increases by one member then the firm 
performance (ROA) will increase by about 2.200. 
On the other hand, the board size and the board composition were found to be negative and 
insignificant determinants of the firm performance at the 0.05 level of significance with 
coefficients (β= -0.145, t= -1.293, p>0.1) and (β= -0.116, t= -1.349, p>0.1) respectively.  
While the firm size was not a significant predictor of the firm performance (β= 0.043 , t= 
0.547, p>0.1), the leverage was found to be a negative and significant predictor of the firm 
performance at the 0.1 level of significance (β= -0.133, t= -1.801, p<0.1).  
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According to the regression results obtained, the firm performance can be predicted by the 
following regression equation:   
 
FIRMPFR(ROA) = 16.816 + 2.836* CEODUATY - 1.884*CEOTENUR + 2.200 *AUDITSIZ  
- 0.052*LEVERAGE   
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
The main objective of this study was to examine the relationship between board 
characteristics (CEO duality, COE tenure, audit committee size, board size and board 
composition) and firm performance in the Kuwait listed non-financial firms for the year 2009 
and the firm performance (ROA). It should be noted that banks, as well as other financial 
institutions are excluded from the sample of the study. With regards to the examination of the 
impact of board characteristics (CEO duality, CEO tenure, audit committee size, board size 
and board composition) of the Kuwaiti non-financial firms listed on the Kuwaiti Stock 
Exchange, upon the firm performance (ROA), the multiple linear regression analysis was 
utilized. 
The regression analysis results regarding the relationships between the corporate governance 
variables, control variables and the ROA displayed in Table 6. More specifically, CEO duality 
was found to have a positive significant effect on ROA, the firm performance, at the 0.05 
level of significance (β=0.164, t value=2.018, p<0.05). This finding supports the first 
hypothesis (H1) that there is a relationship between CEO duality and firm performance. This 
positive sign indicates that the performance of a particular firm increases when the chairman 
of the board is holding the CEO position. This result is in line with those found by Bhagat & 
Black (2002), Yermack (1996) who investigated the relationship between CEO duality and 
firm performance of U.S and Pakistan respectively. They find that there is a positive 
association between CEO duality and firm performance. The result supports the stewardship 
theory which states that whenever the CEO also acts as the chairman, the performance of the 
company increases due to the fact that the owner of the company is relatively familiar and 
more desirous of raising capital (Williamson, 1985). 
Moreover, the statistical results in Table6 provide a support for the hypothesis(H2) regarding 
the relationship between CEO tenure and firm performance. It is shown that the CEO tenure 
has a significant negative impact on ROA at the 0.01 of significance (β=-0.620, t 
value=-9.413, p<0.01). This result indicates that the longer period the CEO spends in his 
position, the more decreasing the firm performance is. Moreover, this negative effect is found 
to be very strong as β= -0.620. This result is similar to that found by Kyereboah-Coleman 
(2007) and Bertsch & Mann (2005) who investigated the relationship between CEO tenure 
and firm performance of Ghana and U.S respectively and found a negative association 
between CEO tenure and firm performance. 
In addition to that, the results in Table 6 showed that  the audit committee size has a positive 
significant impact on the ROA at the 0.01 level of significance (β=0.312, t value=2.769, 
p<0.01).That is the third hypothesis of this study (H3)regarding the relationship between audit 
committee size and firm performance was supported. This finding implies that the higher 
audit committee size in number, the higher the firm performance measured by ROA is. This 
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finding is similar to that found by Mallin (2007) among the U.S. companies and 
Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) and Kajol & Sunday (2008) among Nigerian companies. 
The results with regards to the effect of board size on firm performance was found to be a 
negative but not significant (β= -0.145, t value=-1.293, p>0.1) indicating that the hypothesis 
(H4)regarding this relationship was not supported. This negative value indicates that the 
increase in board size causes the decrease of firm performance measured by ROA. Some 
other previous studies such as those conducted by Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Haniffa & 
Hudaib (2006), Yermack (1996), Vafeas (2000) and Mak & Li (2001) found that board size is 
negatively related to the firm performance when investigated this relationship in the 
American and Malaysian firms. 
The results pertaining to the effect of the board composition on the ROA showed that it is 
negative insignificant (β= -0.116, t value=-1.346, p>0.1). This result shows that the 
hypothesis (H5) postulating this relationship was not supported. The negative value indicates 
that the higher the value of the board composition, the lower is the firm performance (ROA). 
The negative relationship between board composition and firm performance has been 
confirmed by some previous studies such as those conducted by Haniffa & Hudaib (2006) in 
Malaysia, Mac Avoy, Dana, Cantor &Peck (1983)in Singapore  and Klein (1998) in the 
United States.  
With regards to the company size and leverage, the results obtained showed that while 
leverage was found to have a negative and significant effect on ROA, firm size was found to 
have positive but not significant effect on ROA. In more details, the results in Table 6 showed 
that the size of the company found to positively but insignificantly affect the firm 
performance (ROA) (β= 0.043, t value=0.547, p>0.1). The positive sign indicates that the 
larger the firm in size, the higher its performance is. In a previous study, Klapper and Love 
(2003) found that the size of the firm significantly and positively affects its performance. This 
might be so since when the firm is large, it is more likely to have  broader activities, 
production range , value creation sources and influence on the market(Bohren, 2005). Finally, 
the results also showed that the debt ratio of a firm has a negative significant impact on the 
firm performance of Kuwaiti companies as measured by ROA(β= -0.133, t value=-1.801, 
p<0.01). This finding supported the hypothesis regarding this relationship indicating that if 
the increase in the firm’s leverage will cause a decrease in the firm performance. In other 
words, the results show that the higher the debt ratio, the lower ROA. This conclusion is in 
line with that reported by Bohren (2005), but contrasts with that reported by Coleman and 
Biekpe (2006). This can be explained by the fact that the Kuwaiti financial market is even 
less effective and may not provide the official position based on the assumption of free cash 
flow. A further possible explanation is that firms face high debt to increase the cost of 
operations, as they try to fulfil their obligations to pay interest rates higher. Table 7 
summarizes the results regarding the hypotheses of the study. 
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Table 7: 
Summary of the Hypothesis Results 
Hypothesis Relationship Results Decision 
H1 CEO duality and ROA Positive and 
Significant 
Supported 
H2 CEO tenure and ROA Negative and 
Significant 
Supported 
H3 Audit committee size and  
ROA 
Positive and 
Significant 
Supported 
H4 Board size and ROA Negative and 
Insignificant 
Not Supported 
H5 Board composition and ROA Negative and 
Insignificant 
Not Supported 
6. Contributions of Study 
This study is one of the very few studies conducted to examine the effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanisms on the Gulf countries.  Specifically, the value of this study comes 
from its focus on the companies listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange to investigate the 
relationship between corporate governance (board characteristics) and firm performance. This 
study, apart from being the few studies in the developing countries with unique business 
environment, it provides the business owners as well as investors some insights into how the 
performance can be dependent on the corporate governance implemented mechanisms. In 
general, this study provides academics and practitioners with a clear view about the 
relationship between board characteristicsand firm performances in Kuwait.  
7. Limitation of the Study 
As with other studies, there are several limitations faced this study based on which the 
findings of the study are to be explained. The  first limitation is related to the research 
design utilized as the study solely considered companies listed on the Kuwait stock exchange 
with particular emphasis on the non-financial companies and hence, overlooking financial as 
well as non-listed companies. It comes to reasoning that the validation of the outcome might 
not hold true for financial companies and other non-listed companies and hence, making 
generalization to all sectors impossible.     
The second limitation arranges the sole examination of general suspects who leads to the 
determination of board effectiveness such as CEO duality, CEO tenure, audit committee size, 
board size and board composition and their link to firm performance without examining other 
corporate governance features such as ownership structures, board and audit committee 
process and auditor quality. The limitations of this study come from the nature of data 
collected due to the limitations of annual reports, disclosure that were available in Kuwait as 
compared with the other developed countries.   
8. Future Research Directions 
Due to the earlier discussed limitations, future research could follow various avenues of 
research to better explain the corporate governance and firm performance relationship. First, 
future research could attempt to explore the nature of these relationships in financial 
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companies and unlisted companies as well employing different methods and employing the 
data for longer periods to explore the long term behavior of such relationships. 
Second, further studies on the subject can also be extended to include various aspects of BOD 
characteristics and explore board processes such as remuneration and nominating committees, 
board of director’s frequency meeting and experience on board of directors.  
Third, for the sake of generalizability, future research might intensively investigate these 
relationships in different countries to examine to what extent they might be affected by the 
differences in business environments, cultures, level of education, etc. 
Fourth, the bulk of the literature has focused on the examination of direct relationship 
between corporate governance factors and firm performance. Therefore, in order to build a 
model that can comprehensively explain the firm performance, future research should 
investigate the effect of some suggested moderating variables such as CEO compensation, 
board size, the culture, accounting as well as legal experience, board commitment, and 
having foreign members in the board of directors.  
Fifth, in measuring the firm performance, future research should consider the combination of 
other measurements of performance such as Tobin's Q, operating cash flow (OCF), DY , 
COC, return on equity (ROE) and profit margin (PM). This study has focused on the 
accounting based measures of the firm performance measure only. Future research regarding 
the firm performance should try to use accounting and the marketing based measures to 
account for the past as well as the future potential performance. 
Sixth, future studies should attempt to investigate the integrated effect of internal and external 
corporate governance factors on the firms’ performance to clarify the potential causes of 
enhanced performance to attract more capital and generate wealth. Moreover, the effect of the 
ownership structure with board structure on the firm performance should be considered in the 
future research. 
Seventh, to better explain the determinants of the firm performance, future researcher should 
consider some committees under board structure such as the risk committee, the credit 
committee, the remuneration committee and other. More importantly, the role of internal 
audit, the role of the secretary and the importance of the board change could be seen as 
important variables in explaining the firm performance. 
Last but not least, despite the fact that the role of the developing countries in forming the 
global economy has been growing impressively, a little attention has been paid by the 
researchers to examine the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanism for firms’ 
performance. In other words, the focus of the researchers was heavily practiced in the 
developed countries and there are limited studies conducted, in this regard, in the developing 
countries. The importance of the Gulf region has been acknowledged globally due to its oil 
production and reserves. As a result, this region has been the destination of huge FDI inflows 
in oil-related industries and other sectors as well. It is widely acknowledged that the effective 
corporate governance mechanisms in the Gulf companies help firms as well as investors to 
confidently set up partnership to enhance business performance. Therefore, there should an 
increasing attention to examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance in the Gulf countries. 
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